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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Appellee, : 
v. : Case No. 960702-CA 
JOHN MICHAEL TETMYER, : Priority No. 2 
Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION mV NATURE OF PRQCESPIN3S 
This is an appeal from a conviction for possession of a 
controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) (1996). This Court has jurisdiction 
over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e) (1996) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court correctly determine that, under the 
totality of the circumstances, reasonable suspicion justified the 
stop of defendant's vehicle? 
w[W]hether a particular set of facts gives rise to 
reasonable suspicion is a determination of law and is reviewable 
nondeferentially for correctness." State v, Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 
939 (Utah 1994). This standard, however, "conveys a measure of 
discretion to the trial judge." Id. While the reviewing court's 
examination will fall short of a de novo review, it must still be 
sufficient "to assure that the purposes of the reasonable-
suspicion requirement are served." Id. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.20 (1993), governing open 
containers of alcoholic beverages in motor vehicles, provides in 
part: 
(1) A person may not drink any alcoholic 
beverage while operating a motor vehicle or 
while a passenger in a motor vehicle, whether 
the vehicle is moving, stopped, or parked on 
any highway. 
(2) A person may not keep, carry, possess, 
transport, or allow another to keep, carry, 
possess, or transport in the passenger 
compartment of a motor vehicle, when the 
vehicle is on any highway, any container 
which contains any alcoholic beverage if the 
container has been opened, its seal broken, 
or the contents of the container partially 
consumed. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with possession of a controlled 
substance (mushrooms), a third degree felony; possession of a 
controlled substance (marijuana), possession of paraphernalia, 
and driving under the influence, all class B misdemeanors; and an 
open container violation, a class C misdemeanor (R. 1-2). He 
2 
moved to suppress all evidence (R. 14-15). After an evidentiary 
hearing, the trial court denied the motion (R. 84). Defendant 
subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea to the single 
felony count, and all other charges were dismissed (R. 27-33, 34-
35) . The court then imposed and stayed a prison sentence and 
ordered defendant to serve 24 months of informal probation and 
pay a fine of $1480 (R. 34-35). This timely appeal followed (R. 
36) . 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
When reviewing a lower court's decision denying a 
defendant's motion to suppress, this Court will "recite the facts 
in a light most favorable to the lower court's findings." State 
v. Montoya. 314 Utah Adv. Rep. 54, 54 (Utah App. 1997) (citing 
State v. Anderson. 910 P.2d 1229, 1230 (Utah 1996)). 
Rick Eldredge, a Utah Highway Patrol trooper, and Jim 
Eberling, a Monticello city police officer, were sitting in a 
window booth at the Trailside convenience store in Monticello, 
when Eldredge saw an individual approach and almost fall as he 
went up the steps to the store, wvery unsure of himself," and 
then head directly for the bathrooms (R. 52-53, 54, 61, 63, 65). 
This individual, who had alighted from the passenger side of a 
car parked at the gas pumps, had "very red, glassy eyes," was 
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"staggering off line," and appeared to be "very intoxicated" (R. 
53-54, 63). On the way back out of the store, he nearly fell 
down the steps again (R. 53). 
Eldredge brought this activity to the attention of Officer 
Eberling, who also began to watch (R. 53). Eberling confirmed 
that the passenger was staggering and that he was unsure of his 
footing: "You could see he was very deliberate with his walking, 
looking at the ground, making sure he watched his steps" (R. 66). 
Defendant, meanwhile, was gassing up the car. According to 
Eberling, he was "using the car as a balance point with his hand. 
And when he'd move away from it, you could see he was a little 
unsteady, and he'd put his hand back down on the car" (R. 66). 
After defendant finished fueling his vehicle, he came into 
the store, wearing "very dark sunglasses," which he kept on while 
in the dark store (R. 53). He, too, headed straight for the 
bathroom and "appeared to be walking offline" (Id.). Defendant 
then bought a few items and left the store (R. 62). 
Meanwhile, Officer Eberling asked Trooper Eldredge if he 
could borrow a camera, and the two of them went outside to the 
trunk of Eldredge's vehicle to get it (R. 53). Eberling took the 
camera and drove out of the parking lot just before defendant and 
his passenger pulled out (R. 54). Soon thereafter, Eldredge 
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hurriedly closed his trunk and also left. He caught up with 
defendant's vehicle at the edge of town and stopped it (R. 54). 
Defendant ultimately was found in possession of controlled 
substances, paraphernalia, and open containers. However, because 
only the initial stop is at issue, no other facts are relevant to 
the disposition of this appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The officer in this case stopped defendant's vehicle after 
observing the following conduct at a convenience store: 1) the 
passenger who alighted from the vehicle was obviously 
intoxicated, as revealed by a staggered gait, missteps, and red, 
glassy eyes; 2) defendant was walking "off line," with "somewhat 
of a stagger"; 3) defendant and the passenger both made a beeline 
for the restroom at the convenience store; and 4) defendant 
continued to wear his dark sunglasses while in the store. 
These four factors, when viewed together, are sufficient to 
justify the stop for either an open container violation or 
driving under the influence. Defendant's argument to the 
contrary is flawed because he considers innocent behaviors --
factors 3 and 4 -- in isolation. This is directly contrary to 
the totality of the circumstances test appropriate for assessing 
reasonable suspicion and is contrary to Utah precedent. In 
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addition, defendant incorrectly asserts that the passenger's 
intoxication is irrelevant to the reasonable suspicion 
determination because it does not implicate defendant in any 
criminal activity. Indeed, it is directly relevant to an open 
container violation and served as a "red flag" to the officer in 
assessing whether defendant, too, might be intoxicated. Finally, 
defendant improperly seeks to revisit the credibility 
determination made by the trial court concerning the testimony of 
the arresting officer. Given the record in this case, deference 
to the trial court is especially appropriate. 
ARSUMENT 
CONSIDERED IN COMBINATION, THE FOUR 
FACTORS ARTICULATED BY OFFICER 
ELDREDGE CREATED A REASONABLE 
SUSPICION THAT DEFENDANT WAS 
COMMITTING AN ALCOHOL-RELATED 
OFFENSE 
Under the Fourth Amendment, a vehicle stop may be justified 
by one of two rationales. First, a stop is justified if an 
officer sees a traffic violation being committed. Second, as is 
the case here, a vehicle stop is justified if it is "based on 
specific, articulable facts and reasonable inferences derived 
from these facts that would lead a reasonable officer to conclude 
that the occupant of the vehicle had committed, or was about to 
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commit a crime." State v. Bello. 871 P.2d 584, 586 (Utah App. 
1994), cert, denied, 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994). The officer must 
be able to point to facts which, "taken together with rational 
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). Courts will examine the 
totality of the circumstances present at the time of the stop to 
determine if there was an objective basis for suspecting criminal 
activity. See State v. Nguyen. 878 P.2d 1183, 1186 (Utah App. 
1994) . 
In this instance, Trooper Eldredge articulated four specific 
facts that, together, aroused his suspicion that defendant and 
his passenger had been drinking and, thus, justified the stop of 
defendant's vehicle: 1) defendant's passenger was "very 
intoxicated," as evidenced by his staggering gait and red, glassy 
eyes (R. 53, 54); 2) defendant, the less obviously impaired of 
the two, "wasn't walking normal [sic], just appeared like he 
wasn't handling himself very well, somewhat of a stagger" (R. 54, 
64); 3) defendant and his passenger made a beeline for the 
bathroom (R. 63); and 4) defendant continued to wear his very 
dark sunglasses while in a dark store (R. 53). 
Defendant claims that Trooper Eldredge was acting on nothing 
more than a "hunch" when he initiated the stop of defendant's 
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vehicle. He argues that the passenger's intoxication did not 
implicate defendant in any criminal activity and so "adds little 
to the reasonable suspicion analysis" (Br. of App. at 8). He 
also asserts that because wearing sunglasses indoors and heading 
directly for the bathroom at a convenience store are consistent 
with innocent behavior, they cannot lend support to an inference 
of unlawful behavior (Id.). Finally, defendant seeks to revisit 
the credibility determination made by the trial court concerning 
the testimony of Trooper Eldredge and Officer Eberling as it 
related to signs of intoxication exhibited by defendant (Br. of 
App. at 9-10). 
Defendant's argument fails for several reasons. First, the 
passenger's obvious intoxication is not irrelevant to the 
officer's reasonable suspicion that defendant was involved in 
alcohol-related criminal behavior. The passenger's intoxication 
is an important fact giving rise to reasonable suspicion that: 1) 
defendant was violating the open container law; or 2) defendant 
was driving under the influence of alcohol.1 
1
 The trial court addressed both of these grounds. It 
first found that a brief detention was justified to determine if 
defendant was driving under the influence. The court described 
this decision as "a close case" (R. 82 or addendum A). Second, 
the trial court found that the officer was justified, "probably 
on firmer ground," to stop the vehicle to determine if there were 
8 
The open container law makes it illegal for a passenger to 
drink any alcoholic beverage in a motor vehicle, regardless of 
whether the vehicle is moving, stopped, or parked on a highway. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.20(1)(1993). If the officer has 
reason to suspect that the passenger is violating the law, the 
officer is justified in stopping the driver of the vehicle in 
which the passenger is riding. Cf. State v. Lopes, 552 P.2d 120, 
122, 123 (Utah 1976)(police justified in stopping driver of 
vehicle where they had warrant of arrest for passenger). 
The open container law, however, goes further than simply 
forbidding passengers from drinking alcohol in vehicles. The law 
also makes it illegal for a driver to allow a passenger to keep, 
carry, possess, or transport an open container of alcohol in the 
passenger compartment of his car. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-
44.20 (2) (1993). Thus, even assuming arguendo that defendant had 
not been drinking at all in the vehicle, his passenger's obvious 
intoxication under the circumstances presented here could 
reasonably lead an officer to suspect that defendant was 
violating the open container law by permitting a passenger to 
either drink or have an open container of alcohol in the vehicle. 
open containers (R. 83). 
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See State v. Davis. 821 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah App. 1991)(reasonable 
suspicion of open container violations as to passenger and driver 
where officer sees can of beer on trunk of car, open passenger 
door, and man urinating). 
The inference of an open container violation in this case is 
supported not by the passenger's intoxication alone, but also by 
considering the quick trips to the bathroom by both individuals, 
facts that uxby reason of simple biology"' support the 
articulable suspicion of an alcohol-related offense. See Davis. 
821 P.2d at 11. As this Court has noted: "In developing a 
reasonable articulable suspicion, law enforcement officers are 
entitled to reach 'common-sense conclusions about human 
behavior.'" State v. Smith. 833 P.2d 371, 372 (Utah App. 
1992)(quoting United States v. Sokolow. 490 U.S. 1, 109 S.Ct. 
1581, 1585 (1989) ) . 
In a totality of the circumstances analysis, the passenger's 
obvious intoxication is also highly relevant to the officer's 
reasonable suspicion that defendant might be driving under the 
influence.2 Indeed, the passenger's intoxication was the central 
2
 Defendant also argues that the passenger's intoxication 
should be irrelevant to reasonable suspicion of driving under the 
influence because it would have *a chilling effect" on the 
willingness of individuals to serve as designated drivers (Br. of 
10 
factor that triggered Trooper Eldredge's closer scrutiny of the 
entire situation before him (R. 53) . The trial court recognized 
the importance of the passenger's drunkenness to the overall 
assessment by noting, of the driver's "walking not in a straight 
line coming into the store": "It's something that [Trooper 
Eldredge] may not have really paid attention to were it not for 
the obviously intoxicated condition of the passenger" (R. 81 or 
addendum A). The passenger's drunkenness served, in essence, as 
a red flag, alerting the officer to carefully scrutinize the 
entire situation. Contrary to defendant's assertion, then, the 
passenger's intoxication was highly relevant to the reasonable 
suspicion determination. 
Second, defendant cites two instances of innocent behavior, 
asserting that such behavior cannot constitute a rational basis 
for inferring criminal conduct. Particularly, he focuses on the 
haste with which he and his passenger headed for the bathroom and 
his failure to remove his sunglasses inside the store. He argues 
that these behaviors cannot provide a rational basis for 
App. at 9). Certainly, as the trial court noted, this could be a 
concern (R. 82). But if officers and reviewing courts adhere to 
the totality of the circumstances test, taking into account not 
only the passenger's condition, but also the designated driver's 
apparent sobriety and any other relevant circumstances, 
defendant's "chilling effect" will remain unrealized. 
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inferring either that he or his passenger were drinking or that 
he was seeking to hide bloodshot eyes (Br. of App. at 8). 
The problem with defendant's argument is that he considers 
these facts individually, isolating them from the totality of the 
circumstances in order to highlight their innocuousness. The 
possibility of an innocent explanation for a particular behavior 
does not negate the reasonable suspicion of criminal activity 
that may grow from an officer's assessment of the entire 
situation with which the officer is faced. See State v. Poole. 
871 P.2d 531, 535 (Utah 1994)(discussing same principal in 
analogous context of probable cause determination). Indeed, this 
Court has noted that "where a defendant's conduct is 'conceivably 
consistent with innocent . . . activity,' but is also 'strongly 
indicative' of criminal activity, we will not hesitate to 
conclude that reasonable suspicion exists." Provo City Corp. v. 
Spotts. 861 P.2d 437, 440 (Utah App. 1993)(citation omitted). 
Furthermore, this Court has acknowledged that "a trained law 
enforcement officer may be able to perceive and articulate 
meaning in given conduct which would be wholly innocent to the 
untrained observer." State v. Trujillor 739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah 
App. 1987)(citing United States v. Mendenhall. 446 U.S. 544, 564 
(1980)). 
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In this case, the trial court recognized that the two facts 
seized upon by defendant were "insufficient in and of themselves, 
and I think insufficient even the two of them combined to justify 
suspicion" (R. 81). However, when the trial court considered 
these two individually innocent objective facts in conjunction 
with the passenger's obvious intoxication and the driver's 
apparent unsteadiness, a different gloss on the facts emerged, 
permitting the trial court to conclude that all of the facts 
together indicated the likelihood of criminal activity (R. 81-
82). That is, factors that had no particular significance in 
isolation -- such as making a beeline for the bathroom, wearing 
sunglasses inside, or even uwalking off-line" -- when viewed 
together and in light of the passenger's obvious drunkenness, 
formed a reasonable basis for inferring a likely alcohol-related 
offense. The trial court's ruling thus properly analyzed the 
facts as a collective whole in order to determine that the 
officer was justified in making a brief investigatory stop to 
confirm or dispel his suspicion. See State v. Humphrey. 314 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 48, 52 (Utah App. 1997)(innocent behaviors combined to 
justify reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle). 
Finally, defendant seeks to revisit the trial court's 
assessment of witness credibility (Br. of App. at 9-10). In a 
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suppression hearing, the trial court acts as the trier of fact 
and, as such, is "authorized to determine the credibility of the 
witnesses and to believe or disbelieve any witness." State v. 
Carlgen, 638 P.2d 512, 515 (Utah 1981), cert, denied. 455 U.S. 
958 (1982). "Because of the trial court's position of advantage 
to observe witnesses' demeanor and other factors bearing on 
credibility, [a reviewing court] will not disturb its factual 
assessment underlying a decision to grant or deny a suppression 
motion unless it clearly appears that the lower court was in 
error." State v. Ashe. 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987)(footnote 
omitted). 
In this case, in assessing Trooper Eldredge's testimony, the 
court did not, as defendant asserts, "relieve . . . [him] of the 
obligation to point to specific and articulable facts" (Br. of 
App. at 10). To the contrary, after Trooper Eldredge had been 
questioned both on direct and cross-examination and had 
articulated the four factors already discussed, the court pressed 
him even further, asking him to demonstrate how defendant was 
walking (R. 63). The following colloquy occurred: 
The Court: Can you demonstrate the way he was 
walking? 
Witness: Get down and demonstrate? 
14 
The Court: Uh huh [ indicat ing affirmative] . 
Witness: 
The Court 
Witness: 
The Court: 
Witness; 
The Court; 
Witness: 
The Court: 
[The witness gets down from the witness 
stand.] The first guy or the driver? 
The driver. 
He stepped up on the curb something like 
this [indicating], walked into the 
bathroom, just wasn't walking normal, 
just appeared like he wasn't handling 
himself very well, somewhat of a 
stagger. 
Well, you kind of stumbled like when you 
indicated him stepping up on the curb. 
Yeah. He stumbled, caught himself, 
almost fell down like the first guy. 
I don't understand what you mean by 
offline. 
A person normally walks like this, okay 
[indicating]. When I say offline, I'm 
talking he's walking like this 
[indicating]. [The witness resumes the 
witness stand]. 
All right. That's all I have. 
(R. 63-64). In its ruling, the trial court acknowledged the 
subtle abnormality in gait that the witness had demonstrated, 
noting that only after seeing the passenger in an obviously 
intoxicated state did defendant's more subtle impairment take on 
significance in the eyes of the officer (R. 81). After 
acknowledging this subtlety, as well as the corroborating 
15 
testimony of Officer Eberling, the court determined that Trooper 
Eldredge was credible. 
Here, the trial court saw the witnesses, had the opportunity 
to assess them first-hand and, indeed, even asked follow-up 
questions to clarify relevant testimony. Under the 
circumstances, the trial court's ruling cannot be said to be 
against the clear weight of the evidence. See Ashe. 745 P.2d at 
1258. Consequently, this Court should defer to the trial court's 
credibility assessment and leave its ruling undisturbed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this _4_ day of June, 1997. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
9 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
y$flM*j£^ 
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ADDENDUM A 
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M.JaneMusselman 
Certified Court Transcriber 
P.O. Box 531 
THE COURT: Well, I don't want officers stopping 
people who walk into the Trailside or any other convenience store 
wearing sunglasses and not taking them on when they walk into the 
store. Because I wear sunglasses when I drive. They're prescription 
sunglasses, and I don't change them to these glasses I'm wearing 
today just' cause I walk inside the — a convenience store. I don't 
want officers stopping people just because they make a beeline for 
the restroom when they stop at a gas station. Those are both 
innocent enough that certainly standing on their own, they are items 
that do — that do not narrow down the field sufficiently to justify 
stopping someone under those circumstances. 
Those are indicators, light indicators, which are insufficient in ano] 
of themselves, and I think insufficient even the two of them combined 
to justify suspicion. When you add — In this case you add to that 
someone who was walking — that wasn't walking straight. And I 
recognize the difficulty of describing or even mimicking that behavior, 
because it's kind of a thing that, who was it; Justice Steward or 
Justice Powell said about obscenity: *You know it when you see it, butj 
it's hard to describe. You know, you can kind of tell, but it's difficult 
to describe why it is you think someone may be intoxicated. 
And I think the officer has been fair in describing that this was 
not obvious. It's something that he may not have really paid 
attention to were it not for the obviously intoxicated condition of the 
passenger. But, I think there's an indicator there, and I — I believe 
the officer when he says that this fellow was not walking in a straight 
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M. Jane Musselman 
Certified Court Transcriber 
P.O. Box 531 
Monticello, Utah 84535 
line. And I consider Officer Eberling's testimony in that regard simply 
as an indicator that Trooper Eldredge is probably telling the truth 
about that. Not that it's an independent item of information 
communicated and considered by Trooper Eldredge, but that it 
indicates that it was probably a correct observation. 
And then we have the fourth factor of the obviously intoxicated 
passenger. Now, that's perfect behavior as far as the driver is 
concerned, but it does (and I don't want Troopers stopping everybody 
who has somebody drunk as a passenger in their car. Otherwise, 
what's the point of having a designated driver?), but this is another 
indicator that there may be drinking going on in this car. 
And so I focus first on the question of whether or not there was 
reason to suspect, given these articulated facts, that the driver was 
impaired. And I consider this one a close case, but I find that this 
was reasonable suspicion. I think that when you have these factors, 
these four factors, each of them light, the strongest of which may be 
this walking not in a straight line coming into the store, I think when 
you talk all of the together, I don't think it's too big of a burden on 
society to permit officers in that circumstance to make a brief 
detention to determine if people, like Mr. Tetmyer are — are driving 
under the influence. 
Now, in the event that this is — this is examined by a higher 
court, I'm going to address the question of the open container 
argument. I didn't hear anything from Trooper Eldredge that he went 
through an analysis where he thought, "Gee, there's probably open 
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container here." However, if he had considered that question, I think 
he would have been entitled to, probably on firmer ground, to stop 
this vehicle to determine if there were open containers. I have ruled 
before that where you have a passenger — where you stop a vehicle 
and you have an intoxicated individual in the car, you can look for 
open containers. I think I've ruled that before. 
MS. REILLY: I think the court's referring to the State 
v. Michael Patefield where we didn't have an obviously intoxicated 
passenger. And I think the court ruled if you have somebody with the 
smell of alcohol on them and missing beer containers, that that would 
be probable cause to search. 
THE COURT: Well, probable cause to search, that's a 
lesser — that's a higher standard than reasonable suspicion. 
MR. HALLS: Your Honor, that's the reason I quoted 
the Scott case which that case basically says that even though he 
didn't articulate that he was looking for open containers, the fact that 
he had the legal ability to do so, doesn't preclude the court from 
determining that he was justified, is one of the holdings. In Utah — 
There's a Utah case that quotes that Supreme Court case. 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, anyway, you can add 
findings in there that there was — that the passenger was intoxicated, 
clearly intoxicated, and that I find that it would have been 
justification to consider whether there were open containers in the 
vehicle. 
Now, this case is interesting to note that if Officer Eldredge or 
? e 
1 Trooper Eldredge just walked up to Mr. Tetmyer coming out of the 
2 store, that probably would not even triggered any constitutional 
3 analysis, because that would have been a Level One citizen/police 
4 encounter, could have smelled his breath. But, you know, then you 
5 may have the question of who was driving in order to make a DUI 
6 case stick. You would have had to go through that process 
7 determining who was driving this vehicle. So, I don't fault the officer 
8 for making that judgment. 
9 Okay, the Motion to Suppress is denied. Now, what do you want 
10 to do? Do we have a trial date scheduled in this case? 
n MR. HALLS: I'm not aware of — I didn't bring my 
12 calendar in. I don't know that we do. 
13 MS. WOOD [secretary to county attorney]: We do. 
14 Let me check. 
15 MR. HALLS: We do? 
16 THE COURT: Let's see. Has he plead? 
17 MS. REILLY: Yes, he has, Your Honor. I believe at 
18 the arraignment there's a Waiver of Appearance, and I entered a not 
19 guilty plea. Excuse me, at the preliminary hearing. 
20 THE COURT: Yeah. Actually, we have never 
21 arraigned him. Come on up, Mr. Tetmyer. Everyone Is in agreement 
22 that we can treat it as if the suppression hearing had occurred after 
23 this arraignment? 
24 MS. REILLY: I have no objection. 
25 THE COURT: Mr. Tetmyer, — Do you waive the 
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